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Abstract
We focus on the link between political instability due to uncertain electoral
outcomes and economic growth, through the impact on a government’s
decisions on how to allocate government expenditure between public
consumption and investment. Using an endogenous growth model with
partisan electoral effects, we demonstrate that political uncertainty will
generate a steady-state equilibrium growth rate which is inefficient and too
low. We also use a newly-constructed political data set to estimate panel
regressions for several OECD economies over a period 1960-95. Our
empirical evidence on the effects of political variables on tax and
spending decisions supports our theoretical results.
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There are a number of channels through which political instability can affect
economic growth. One obvious channel is the impact which greater social unrest and
political upheaval and revolution can have on incentives to invest. It is quite apparent
that the lack of protection for property rights may harm prospects for private
investment
1, and may reduce foreign direct investment in a country
2. Similarly, in
countries where rulers are weak and run the danger of being overthrown, policymakers
might have an incentive to allow key groups to engage in rent-seeking activities, which
may again harm economic growth
3. There seems to be considerable empirical evidence
that major political upheaval (as opposed to routine changes of governments that follow
elections) and coups d’état can adversely affect economic growth (see Alesina et al.,
1996, Barro, 1996, and Easterly and Rebelo, 1993).
In modern democracies, where government changes are generally peaceful and
follow constitutional norms, political instability may still have an impact on economic
growth. The main mechanism at work in these models is through the impact of political
instability on government myopia. This myopia occurs when forward-looking
governments are not interested in carrying out long-term economic policies
4 because of
uncertain re-election prospects. For instance, Svensson (1993) emphasises how
governments may be less inclined to make improvements to the legal system.  Calvo and
Drazen (1997) show how policy uncertainty can distort the future path of investment
                                                       
1 For theoretical models in which the lack of enforcement of property rights affects growth, see Tornell
and Velasco (1992) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996). For a survey, see Persson and Tabellini
(1998).
2 See Rodrik (1991).
3 See Murphy et al. (1991).
4 The notion of policy myopia is quite common in political economy models. For alternative models of
fiscal policy in which the incumbent has an incentive not to act in the social interest see Alesina and
Tabellini (1990) and Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994). Peletier et al. (2000) shows that binding
rules on deficits can reduce public investment to inefficient levels.2
decisions. Devereux and Wen (1999) suggest that political instability encourages
governments to run down the economy’s asset base, with the result that future
governments are more likely to raise capital taxation, and this depresses private
investment. Persson and Tabellini (1998) build a 2-period model in which capital
taxation is used to finance public investment, which drives economic growth and
enhances the future tax base. In their model, public investment is valued less by an
incumbent government if re-election is uncertain, because less of the economy’s future
tax revenues will be spent on the incumbent’s preferred public goods. Hence political
instability (a greater uncertainty of re-election for the incumbent) reduces public
investment because it increases policy myopia.
Empirically, there seems to be some evidence in favour of a negative link
between minor political instability (the frequency of changes in a government’s political
complexion) and economic growth (see Alesina et al., 1996, Perotti, 1996). However,
this existing empirical evidence makes use of quite limited measures of political
instability, and does not always focus on industrial democracies.
In this paper, we focus on the link between the political instability (due to
uncertainty in electoral outcomes) and economic growth through the impact on a
government’s decisions on how to allocate government expenditure between public
consumption and public investment.  The value added of our contribution is the
following. First, unlike existing two-period models of the impact of political uncertainty
on growth (see Persson and Tabellini, 1998) we propose an infinite horizon model, and
examine the dynamic interaction of an endogenous growth model with electoral turn-
over.  In existing models myopia generally arises because incumbent governments may
not have access to the future benefits from current taxation and spending decisions
which will accrue to their political constituency. In our model, government myopia3
arises because of office motivation, so that an incumbent government will perceive a
more limited political benefit from decisions taken now which only impact with a lag on
consumer utility. Thus political uncertainty leads to a shift of government budgets from
capital spending to current consumption. Thus, our focus is rather different from that of
other authors, who have tended to concentrate on inequality, the enforcement of
property rights, and public expenditures on different types of public goods. Our view is
that the relationship between public investment and consumption is an important one in
understanding the consequences for growth.
Second, unlike other attempts to model political uncertainty, we take into
account of the preferences of consumers and how these affect the political equilibrium.
We are therefore able to compare the stochastic steady-state growth equilibrium under
political uncertainty with that which would prevail in the presence of an optimal social
planner. This allows us to consider the welfare implications of political uncertainty.
Third, we use a newly-constructed data-set on measures of political uncertainty
to provide empirical support for our theoretical model. Using data on a panel of 13
European economies, we find considerable support for our hypothesis that political
uncertainty affects public investment decisions. The rest of this paper is structured as
follows. In Section 2 we outline our theoretical model and its main results. In Section 3,
we outline our empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes.
2. A Theoretical Model.
We develop an endogenous growth model in which government spending is a major
determinant of growth. We assume a partisan-type political economy set-up in which
two political parties alternate in power. The party in power implements taxation policies
and allocates government expenditures between consumption, which directly increases4
the current utility of consumers, and investment, which encourages future growth and
impacts on consumers’ utility in the future. Consumers are assumed to differ in their
rate of time preference, with some benefiting more than others from future
consumption.
5 Each party’s political platform is given by the rate of time preference at
which future benefits are capitalised. Consumers will therefore vote for the party that
most closely represents their views, and an element of political uncertainty is introduced
by assuming random voter turnout.
6
Before outlining our model in detail, we summarise the key results that emerge.
First, the presence of political uncertainty creates policy myopia. The two political
parties always adopt policies which give rise to lower growth and a higher fraction of
revenues spent on public consumption compared with consumers who share their rate of
time preference. Second, a higher degree of political uncertainty has both negative and
positive effects on the growth rate (via the tax policies chosen by the political parties).
However, the net effect of increased political uncertainty is that it discourages growth
and increases the share of government consumption. Third, the resulting equilibrium is
generally inefficient, and makes the economy grow too slowly.
2.1  The Production and Government Sectors
We assume a continuous-time model, in which the final output sector is perfectly
competitive and there is no private capital
7. The aggregate production function is:
                                                       
5 In a richer model one might want to explain the source of these differences in consumers’ rate of time
preference. These might arise because of the presence or absence of intergenerational links. Our
conclusions, based on infinitely-lived consumers would still hold in a model with overlapping
generations as long as there was some political uncertainty.
6 This can be justified in terms of shifts in the composition and preference distribution of the electorate
(see Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995).
7 This assumption is not particularly restrictive and can be found in many endogenous growth models.
It is assumed here because it makes the model analytically tractable, given that consumers have
different rates of time preference.5
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where  t Y  is final output (a numeraire), L is the working population (which is normalised
to one). Productivity is augmented through the flow of public investment,  t G  and the
variable  t A , which captures a learning-by-doing effect.  We assume that  t A  is
proportional to the accumulation of output production per worker:
t
ts AbYds
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where b>0 measures the degree of the learning-by-doing effect. From (2), increases in
current output raise future productivity, so the flow public expenditure G in (1) can be
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where  / ttt xGA = .
The government taxes final output at a rate 01 t << , hence the first order
condition of the profit maximisation of a competitive firm is
1 (1) ttt wAx
a ta
- =- (4)
where, w is the wage rate. The government allocates a fraction 01 q <<  of tax revenue
to public investment  t G , and the remainder is used for public consumption,  t Z . Hence,
government investment is rewritten as
   ttt GYx
a qtqt =￿= (5)








t Z  is increasing in t  simply because a higher tax revenue means more expenditure. But
it is non-monotonically related to q  due to the presence of 
( ) 1/ aa q
-  which captures the6
positive impact of government investment on output. As we shall see below, the policy
parameters t  and q  will be determined endogenously by the political parties.
We can now derive the growth equilibrium. The production function implies that










Note from (5) that  t x  is constant as long as qt  is fixed. Hence, the growth rate will
jump whenever there is a (stochastic) change of government which causes a change in q






using (3), (5) and (7). This is the economic equilibrium condition.
8
2.2  Voters Preferences and Behaviour
Consumers differ in their rate of subjective time preference, r. This parameter
summarises their political preferences: consumers with a lower r give greater weight to
future consumption and therefore tend to support a growth-oriented party. We assume
that the distribution of preferences is such that [,] rrr ˛  is continuously distributed
with the distribution function F(r).
The consumers’ intertemporal utility function is given by:
()1 st
tss t UecZds
rbb ¥ --- = ￿ (9)
                                                       
8 Hence, the growth rate is monotonically increasing in the tax rate. As shown in Barro (1990),
monotonicity no longer holds in the presence of physical capital accumulation.7
where  s c  is the consumption of final output and  s Z  is the consumption of government
services. In the absence of lending and borrowing, consumers will spend their wages in





where (5) is used. In (10), the term (1) t -  represents a distortionary effect of taxation,
and 
( ) 1/ aa t
-  captures the positive impact of public investment. Note that private
consumption for all consumers is maximised at  1 ta =- . However, consumers are
interested in future as well as current consumption, hence they generally prefer a higher
tax rate than 1-a. The more patient the consumers the higher their ideal tax rate.
Political parties differ in their fiscal policies, and consumers will generally vote
for the party whose policy yields them the highest utility. Thus, we first characterise
each consumer’s ideal settings of t and q (and hence g). Substituting (6) and (10) into
















where  g r >  is assumed. From (11) we can obtain the first-order conditions
9 which
implicitly determine the ideal fiscal policy for each consumer, given his/her value of r:
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(13)
These conditions represent the contemporaneous trade-off between private and public
consumption, and the intertemporal trade-off between future and current private and















Roughly speaking, the LHS of (14) shows the marginal cost to consumers, and the RHS
the marginal benefit, of increasing the growth rate. We are now able to state:
LEMMA 1 (i) The consumers’ ideal g is uniquely determined in (14), and (ii) an
interior solution to (14) exists for r>b.
Proof. Note that the LHS and RHS of (14) are monotonically increasing in g; also
(/)/(/)/1 MCgMBgg rr ¶¶¶¶r => , which implies that the MC curve is always
steeper than the MB curve for  (0,) g r ˛  (as shown in Figure 1). Moreover,
/1 0 at 0 MBMCbg
aa
rr




- -=-  at  g r = . Therefore
a unique interior solution exists for (/)1 b r > .￿
[Figure 1 here]
Note that the equilibrium is “stable” as the MB curve cuts the MC curve from above.
We can now define the relationship between the consumers’ rate of time preference and
their preferred fiscal policies (and growth rate):
LEMMA 2  The Consumers’ ideal t, q, and g are characterised by the following
functions:
(),     '0 ggg r =< (15)
(),     '0 ttrt =< (16)
(),     '0 qqrq =< (17)
Proof. In Figure 1, a higher value of r shifts down the MB r curve, leading to a lower
growth rate. In addition, from (12) we know that g and t are positively related.






- Øø =- Œœ ºß
  (18)
so that t and q are also positively related as long as  1 tb >- , which we assume to be
true.
10￿
                                                                                                                                                                
9 The second-order conditions are assumed to be satisfied.
10 This assumption makes sense and is required for an interior solution, given the Cobb-Douglas form
of the instantaneous utility function, as otherwise it would imply that the elasticity of utility with
respect to public consumption would be so great as to swamp the benefits from greater public
investment. Consumers would then prefer to allocate no resources at all to public investment.9
An important implication of Lemma 2 is that consumers are distributed along the MM
line in Figure 2 according to an appropriately transformed distribution function of
( ) F r  (M stands for policy mix). The ideal policy mix of the most impatient consumers
(r ) is given by M , and similarly M  is the best policy pair for the most patient
consumers (r ). In general, we can draw a set of indifference curves for different
consumers as defined by (11). In the figure two indifference curves are drawn for
consumers located at  –M  (the solid one) and at M’ (the dotted one). Obviously, the
closer they are to  –M  or M’, the better off they are.
[Figure 2 here]
2.3  Political Parties, Political Uncertainty and Policies
We assume that there are two political parties, whose political platforms are
summarised by their rate of time preference with  H r  for party H and  L r for party L
such that  HL rr >. We follow the standard political economy literature on partisan
models by assuming a majoritarian system, where the incumbent party has total control
on fiscal policy
11. Taking the policy mix(,) ii g t  chosen by the political parties as given,
consumers will decide whether to vote for party H or L.
Party L is relatively more ‘growth-oriented’ than party H in that it gives greater
weight to future outcomes ( HL rr >). In fact, it is possible for a ‘policy reversal’ to
take place, whereby party H delivers a higher growth rate along with a higher tax rate,
HL gg > and  HL tt > . This case is analysed in the Appendix, and does not alter the key
                                                       
11 One potential extension of our model, which we do not explore here for reasons of space, is that the
minority party may also have some control on fiscal policy through a bargaining framework (see for
example Rogoff, 1990).10
results of the paper. To facilitate our exposition, we will continue to focus on the case
where  HL gg <.
 12
Now suppose that points  L M  and  H M  in Figure 2 represent the policy mix
chosen by parties L and H, respectively. Then, we can define the threshold consumers
who are indifferent between supporting party H and party L. Suppose that they have the
rate of time preference  ￿r , so that
￿ ( ) ￿ ( ) ,,,, tLLtHH UgUg rtrt = (19)
This is depicted in Figure 2 where  L M  and  H M  lie on the same indifference curve of
the consumers whose ideal policy mix is  –M . Moreover, note that  L M  is always located
northeast of  H M . Also note that as r  rises/falls, the indifference curve drawn for a
given level of welfare moves down/up along the MM  line. For example, the dotted
indifference curve is for consumers whose optimal policy bundle is at M’ with their r
being lower than  ￿r . They prefer party L’s policy mix  L M  to  H M . It should now be
clear that voters with a higher value of r will vote for party H and those with a lower
value of r will vote for party L.
In this class of majoritarian political economy models, the median voter
determines the winning party in the election. Political uncertainty is introduced by
assuming random voter turnout (see Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). The distribution of
consumers who actually vote alternates stochastically between the two states. In one
state, the distribution function of voters is given by  ( ) l F r , and it changes to  ( ) h F r  in
another state. We use   and  lh rr to denote the rates of time preference of the median
                                                       
12 This assumption is not crucial for our key results, but it simplifies the exposition of the model.11
voters associated with each distribution function, i.e.  ()()1/2 llhh FF rr == . The only
condition that we impose on the distribution functions is
13:
lh rrr << % (20)
Figure 3 illustrates the possible form of the density functions associated with these
distribution functions.
[Figure 3 here]
Because of the random voter turnout, the number of voters who support each
political party changes. The measure of consumers who will vote for party L and H is
denoted by  L N  and  1 HL NN =-, respectively. Since consumers with  ￿ rr <  vote for
party L, we have ￿ ( ) Lj NF r = , j=l,h. Given (20), when voters are distributed according
to  ( ) l F r , the number of party L supporters is  ()()1/2 LlllH NFFN rr =>=> % . When
the distribution is given by  ( ) h F r , we have  ()()1/2 LhhhH NFFN rr =<=< % . Hence,
the two parties will alternate in power. Party L will win the election in the state with
() l F r , and party H will win in the state with  () h F r .
We model the degree of political uncertainty by assuming a Markov process for
the stochastic change between the two distribution functions:
()() with a flow probability   









Note that by setting hl =  we have a similar situation to one in discrete time where
both parties have an equal chance of being elected. An increase in these flow
probabilities will increase the degree of political uncertainty because it will lead to a
greater number of government changes.
                                                       
13 It does not matter if there is a shift in either of the supports of the distribution.12
Next we turn our attention to the incentives faced by each party in deciding on
its policy mix. Elections are assumed to take place at each instant
14. Each party




bb - . We also assume that each party is office-motivated, in that it gains a
zero pay-off when out of office.
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where  () it VA  is the value function which party i achieves when it is in office, and  ˆ () it VA
when it is out of office, and  i p  is defined as the flow probability of losing the current




bb - during interval dt. But during this time interval, the technological level
of the economy will have improved by gAdt , which enters the value function at the end
of the time interval. At that time, party i will still be in office with a probability of
(1) i pdt - , achieving  () i VAgAdt + , or will lose the election with a complementary
probability  i pdt , attaining  ˆ () i VAgAdt + .
Given an infinite horizon, a party which loses office will always expect to return
to office at some future date and its current policies will therefore have an impact on
                                                       
14 As noted previously our conclusions would not be affected by considering a discrete-time version of
the model in which elections are held in every period. Our continuous-time set-up merely makes the
analysis of our endogenous-growth model easier.
15 There are different ways of introducing office motivation in a political party’s pay-off function (see
Rogoff, 1990, Persson and Tabellini, 1990, 1998). In models where elections have a disciplining effect
on incumbent governments, one can introduce office motivation as a fixed benefit from being in office,
or fixed cost from being out of office. However, our purpose here is to show how policy myopia can
arise in a partisan model, and policy myopia effects will emerge as long as the political benefits to a
party from being in office are related to the policy actions taken. Thus, for instance, our results would
still hold in a model where each party derives some benefit from the policies undertaken by other
governing parties, as long as the benefits it receives when in office depend in some measure on the
utility of those who elected them. Of course assuming a non-zero pay-off for each party when it is out
of office involves a considerable increase in analytical complexity.13
future pay-offs even after losing an election. This must be taken into account in
computing  ˆ () i VA  in (21). We can determine  ˆ () i VA  using the following recursive
equation:
ˆˆ ()(1)()(1)() iiiiii VAdtVAgAdtqdtVAgAdtqdt rØø =-+-++ ºß (22)
 where  i q  ( L ql =  and  H qh = ) is each party’s flow probability of winning the current
election if they are out of office. When party i is not in office, at the end of time interval
dt it will lose the next election with probability  (1) i qdt - , attaining  ˆ
i V , or will win the
election with a complementary probability  i qdt , attaining  i V .
In order to determine their equilibrium fiscal policies, the two parties maximise
the RHS of (21), holding  ˆ
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We can compare the chosen policies of the two parties (23) and (24) with the
ideal tax and growth policies of consumers with the same rate of time preference
(equations (12) and (13)). Whilst (23) is identical to (12), (24) differs from (13). Hence
the fiscal policies of each party do not match those of consumers with the same political
stance (time preference). We return to this point below.
2.4  The Stochastic Steady State Growth Equilibrium under Political Uncertainty
We are now in a position to solve for the stochastic steady-state equilibrium.14

































,  LH pqh ==  and  HL pql == .
16
Proof. The equilibrium is characterised by  (), ,
o
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 where 
0
i V  is the initial value. Letting  0 dt ﬁ in the
Bellman equations (21) and (22), and rewriting the resulting equations with the above
conditions gives rise to (G).￿
Condition (G) shows the marginal costs and benefits of increasing the growth rate to
each party, and exactly parallels equation (14), which showed the voters’ preferred
growth rate. Unlike the consumers’ ideal choice for g, the political parties’ decisions are
affected by the additional term  () ii g G , i=L,H: this captures the policy myopia created
by political uncertainty. Before discussing the policy myopia effect in detail, we first
establish the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 2 (i) The growth rate generated by party i’s fiscal policies is uniquely
determined in (G) and (ii) and interior solution to (G) exists for r>b.
Proof. First note that the only difference between (G) and (14) lies in  ( ) ii g G . Also
note that  ()0 i g ¢ G< , so that  i MB  is monotonically increasing in  (0,) g r ˛ . In addition,
()0 for (0,) i gg r G>˛  and  ()0  at 0 and  i ggg r G=== . Hence, as Figure 4 shows,
the  i MB  curve is located entirely below the MB r  curve associated with (14), except for
0  and  gg r ==  where they coincide. Hence, given Lemma 1, a unique interior
solution exists for  b r > . ￿
[Figure 4 here]
The policy myopia effect in (G) results from the presence of political
uncertainty. The two parties essentially use an uncertainty-adjusted discount rate,
                                                       
16 Note that (G) is independent of (i) the number of consumers who vote for the parties (i.e. they do not
care about the extent of loss/win of the election) and (ii) the political platform of the other party (e.g.
L g  is not affected by  H r ). This is due to the simplifying assumption that the political parties get zero
payoffs when out of office.15
() ii g r +G  which is higher to that of consumers with the same rate of time preference.
Figure 4 shows that the growth rate chosen by party i is not identical to the ideal g
chosen by consumers who share the party’s political preferences. The knowledge that
party i will lose office at some stage in the future creates this short-sightedness in
policy. As regards the tax rate and the proportion of tax revenue spent on government
consumption, the results are summarised in (ii) and (iii) of the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3 Political parties always set policies such that (i) the growth rates are
lower, (ii) taxes are lower and (iii) the fraction of tax revenue spent on public
consumption is higher than would be chosen by consumers with the identical rate of
time preference.
Proof. (i) is apparent from Figure 4. (ii) is clear from (12) and (23). (iii) is due to (8).￿
Policy myopia manifests itself as fiscal policy biased towards government consumption
and against growth. The magnitude of the bias depends on the degree of political
uncertainty. Consider party L: a higher flow probability of losing office (i.e.  L ph = )
increases the myopia term,  L G , and the  L MB  curve shifts downward in Figure 4,
reducing  L g . Similarly, an increase in  H pl =  causes party H to reduce  H g . This result
is formally stated as follows:
PROPOSITION 4 If the probability of losing election rises, the incumbent political
parties (i) reduce the growth rate, (ii) decrease the tax rate, and (iii) increase the
proportion of public consumption.
Proof. See Proposition 3.￿
However, an increase in the flow probability of the incumbent party losing office is
equivalent to a higher probability of the opposition party winning the election. The
myopia term  L G  is increasing in h , but  H G  is decreasing in h . We are interested in the
net effect on the average growth rate of changing the degree of political uncertainty.
The average growth rate is given by
(1) LH ggg =L+-L (25)16
where  =/(+) llh L . But increasing either h  or l  unilaterally is equivalent to asking if
a biased increase in political uncertainty encourages or discourages growth.
A more sensible way to examine the effect of political uncertainty is to consider
an unbiased increase in political uncertainty, by increasing l  and h  simultaneously. For
this purpose, define  ii ppq lh ”=== . Then, a higher p increases political uncertainty
that is not biased against a particular party. Both parties alternate in power more
frequently, with neither party increasing its average share of time in office. In this case,
the average growth rate becomes  ()/2 LH ggg =+ . Moreover, the policy myopia term














 which is strictly increasing in p. Thus, a greater political
uncertainty shifts down the  i MB  curve for both parties in Figure 4. This leads to the
following proposition, which complements Proposition 4:
PROPOSITION 5 Following an unbiased increase in political uncertainty, the policy
myopia increases and the average growth rate falls.
The intuition behind this result is that current fiscal policy is influenced more by the
gloomier prospects of the outcome in the immediate election than by the brighter
prospect of being re-elected after losing, since the latter is too distant in future to matter
significantly now.
2.5  Economic Efficiency
Next we consider whether the steady-state stochastic political-economy equilibrium
described above is efficient in terms of consumer welfare. We have already established
that growth is lower than would be preferred by each party’s natural constituency of
voters. However, in itself this it does imply an inefficient outcome.17
Given different preferences among consumers we have to define what we mean
by an ‘efficient outcome’. There are four possible metrics to use for our purpose: (i)-(ii)
the median or mean consumer in the entire population, and (iii)-(iv) the median or mean
of the voters’ distribution which fluctuates. The choice of the entire population or the
voting population depends on whose welfare should be compared to the political
outcome. The use of the median voter metric may be justified by noting that this would
be the chosen policy, if economic policies were directly chosen by the electorate
17. The
mean voter is relevant if welfare is measured by a Utilitarian Social Welfare Function.
However, whatever metric is used, some inefficiency is bound to arise, given the
assumption that the distribution of the rates of time preference of consumers and the
position of political parties are both exogenously given.
A more interesting exercise is to identify the inefficiency caused by the policy
myopia. To do this, we compare the political-economy outcome with the growth rates
which would be chosen by the median or mean voters, assuming that their rates of time
preference happen to coincide with those of the political parties. That is, we ignore the
inefficiency which arises purely because of exogenous differences in r  between these
mean or median voters and the political parties, and focus solely on the impact of policy
myopia. Note that it does not matter whether the median or mean voters are used for
our purpose.
From (14), the growth rates, which the critical (median or mean) voters would
choose, are defined by
















                                                       
17 See Muscatelli (1998) for an example of a model where the economic efficiency of different regimes
is evaluated with distributed preferences in a partisan model of monetary policy.18
where  i r  is assumed to be identical to the rate of time preference of the critical voters.
The associated average growth rate is given by
￿ ￿ ￿ (1) LH ggg =L+-L (27)
We take  ￿g  as the socially optimal growth rate. Now we are in a position to state the
following proposition:
PROPOSITION 6 Policy myopia caused by political uncertainty tends to result in
inefficiency with the average growth rate lower than the social optimum.
Proof. From  (25) and (27), we have
￿ ￿ ( ) ￿ ( ) (1) LH LH gggggg -=L-+-L- (28)
However, we know from Proposition 3 that the political parties always choose the
growth rates which are lower than those preferred by consumers with the identical rate
of time preference, i.e.  ￿
i i gg > , i=H,L. Therefore, Proposition 6 results. ￿
From propositions 3 and 6, it immediately follows that:
PROPOSITION 7 The policy myopia effect tends to make the tax rate inefficiently low
and the proportion of tax revenue spent on public investment excessively low compared
with the social optimum.
Finally, we can briefly comment on the assumption that the rates of time
preferences of consumers and political parties are both given. This is a common
assumption in such partisan political economy models (see Alesina and Rosenthal,
1995). Voters’ preferences tend to show some persistence over time for cultural
reasons. Political parties also tend to change their policy platforms slowly, partly
because they would suffer a loss of credibility if they showed too much mobility over
time (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). Of course consumer preferences do tend to change
gradually, as demographic influences have an impact on desired fiscal policies. In
response, political parties will adapt slowly to a new political landscape. If it takes time
for political parties to reposition themselves following a major voter realignment, then
inefficiencies caused by differences in r  between consumers and political parties could19
be exacerbated
18.
 In contrast, the inefficiency would tend to be reduced, as political
parties try to follow the median or mean voter in a ‘Hotelling effect’. Nevertheless, the
policy myopia effect would still persist as long as some degree of political uncertainty
remains, and will not be eliminated by the repositioning of the political parties relative to
the electorate.
3. Empirical Evidence on the Relationship between Fiscal Policy and Political
Instability
In this section we provide some new empirical evidence on the link between
political instability and fiscal policy, particularly in relation to public investment. An
important element of our model exploits the link between public investment and growth.
A large literature on the impact of government investment spending on productivity
growth concludes that there is strong evidence to suggest that public investment,
particularly spending on public infrastructure, has a positive impact on productivity
growth in industrialised economies
19. In contrast, most studies tend to find a negative
impact of government consumption on economic growth (see Barro, 1996).
Policymakers increasingly perceive that long-term economic success requires a
reallocation of government spending towards public investment.  In the UK, the Labour
government has certainly emphasised a commitment towards a ‘golden rule’ of public
                                                       
18 One can think for instance of how long it took the UK’s Labour Party in the 1980s to reassess its
views on taxation and public spending and ask whether the Conservative Party’s position on public
spending was close to that of the median voter, or merely closer than that of the Labour opposition.
19 This includes both evidence from production and cost function estimates (see inter alia Aschauer,
1989, Munnell, 1990, Morrison and Schwartz, 1992), and from cross-country panel studies (see, for
example, Easterly and Rebelo, 1993).
 Although the size of the total impact of public capital spending
on productivity growth is a matter of some debate (see Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz, 1994) and obviously
varies between countries and sectors, the evidence is generally that government investment is
productive. For some contrary evidence from developing countries where sometimes capital spending is
misallocated, see Devarajan et al. (1996).20
spending, whereby deficit spending would only be allowed (over the cycle) on public
investment.
The evidence linking political instability and fiscal policy is more mixed. There
are numerous studies which explain the rise in the proportion of current expenditures in
total government spending since the mid-1960s in many of the OECD economies in
terms of the political complexion and the weakness of governments (see Roubini and
Sachs, 1989, Alesina and Perotti, 1996, 1997). Many of the attempts in the European
economies to stabilise increasing debt burdens in the late 1980s and 1990s have resulted
in increases in taxation and cuts in capital outlays (see Alesina and Perotti, 1996, 1997).
Perotti and Kontopoulos (1998) provide some evidence linking fragmentation in
governments (the numbers of parties in coalition governments and the number of
ministers in cabinet) to different dimensions of fiscal policy. Here we provide further
evidence on the links between key fiscal variables identified in our theoretical model and
political instability. The value added of this empirical work derives from the fact that we
use an extended set of measures of political instability, which go beyond the usual
measures reported in sources such as Woldendorp  et al. (1993) and Mackie and Rose
(1991, 1997). In particular, we not only use variables which measure the fragmentation
of coalition governments, but also investigate measures of political instability relating to
composition of cabinets, and electoral volatility. The political data used is documented
extensively in Carmignani (1999), and the interested reader is referred to this for further
details of sources and data construction
20.
                                                       
20 The construction of this data set constitutes part of Fabrizio Carmignani’s Ph.D. dissertation. We are
grateful to him for access to his data set, which is defined for individual legislatures and governments,
and which we converted to an annual data set for the purposes of our empirical work.21
In what follows we examine the impact of political instability on fiscal policy
decisions in a panel of 13 European OECD countries
21. These include basically all of the
main Western European nations, excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain because they did
not have democratic regimes in place throughout our sample period. The reason for
restricting our analysis to European countries is that the specification of our panel data
model requires some homogeneity in the countries being considered, and there are some
data limitations in the case of the non-European OECD economies for the political data.
Clearly, with the exception of the UK, these European economies have electoral
systems that tend to give rise to coalition governments. Although our theoretical model
is cast in terms of a two-party system, its results can readily be interpreted for coalition
governments. The key result, which is that government myopia leads to under-spending
on public investment and a shift to public consumption, will carry over in the case where
the two parties (L and H) are interpreted as alternating coalitions, whose probability of
re-election is partly a function of fluctuating electoral preferences, but also in part
dependent on the strength of the coalition. The latter will be affected by shifts in the
coalition groupings, parliamentary and cabinet fragmentation between different parties,
and the perceived time horizon or probability of survival of the incumbent coalition
government.
We examine how two key fiscal ratios, the ratio of government consumption
(GC) in total government spending (GTOT)
22, and the tax revenue (T) to GDP ratio,
are affected by a set of measures of political instability. Our panel data regressions are
                                                       
21 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, the UK.
22 As the government investment ratio (GI/GTOT) is simply a linear transformation, 1-(GC/GTOT), we
focus simply on GC/GTOT.22
estimated over the period
23 1960-96, and the regressions are estimated using a fixed-
effects specification. A fixed-effects specification was seen as most appropriate given
our choice of countries in the sample
24.  In addition to the political variables described
below, we include two lags of real GDP (Y) growth, in order to capture cyclical
variations in the fiscal measures due to automatic stabilisers and not to the political
environment. The political variables used are listed in Table 1. One reason for using
several indicators of political instability is that different indicators might be more
important in capturing instability in different countries
25. For instance, in the case of
Italy, one finds very little electoral volatility in terms of shifts in parliamentary
representation until 1994 (because of its pure proportional representation system), but
much more volatility in the time horizon of each cabinet, and in the effective number of
parties in the governing coalition. In contrast, in the case of Belgium, electoral volatility
is a much more important variable.
                                                       
23 Although our political data ranges from 1945-98, we choose to use fiscal data from the OECD in
order to ensure consistent definitions across the 13 countries, and this limits the range of our sample.
The panel is unbalanced because the political data is only available up to 1995 for some countries, and
the fiscal data is also truncated for some countries because of changes in definitions over time in the
OECD series.
24 We experimented with a random-effects specification and obtained very similar results. In the case of
the random-effects models, the Hausman specification test found no significant correlation between the
random effects and the regressors.
25 One difficulty in measuring the degree of political uncertainty or instability from data on actual
outcomes is that these represent measures of instability as perceived ex post. This is not a perfect
measure of the ex ante degree of political uncertainty and external competition experienced by the
incumbent government during its term of office. Mid-term elections (where these take place) and
regular opinion polls may provide a better guide to the changing pattern of electoral preferences.
However, mid-term national elections tend to be the exception (cf. the United States), and it is difficult
to obtain systematic opinion poll data on a comparable basis, at least for the period before 1980. Hence
it is difficult to conceive of feasible alternatives to our chosen measures of political instability.23
Table 1 – Measures of Political Environment used in Regression Analysis
Measure Definition
Governing Coalition’s Share of
Seats
The share of seats held by the governing coalition in parliament.
This measures the extent to which the governing coalition has a
secure majority in parliament which might affect its perceived
ability to survive.







= ￿ , for a coalition of n parties
where SH(i) is the share of seats held by party i. This provides a
measure of the effective number of parties in the governing
coalition, and is a measure of the fractionalisation of the cabinet –
i.e. whether one or two large parties dominate it or made up of
many small parties of equal size. See Laasko and Taagepera
(1979).






= ￿ for a coalition of n parties
where L(i) is each party’s location on a left-right linear scale, , as
composed by political scientists.  The median location is 5.5, so
that a value > 5.5 indicates a right-of centre government. Unlike
the simple 5-point complexion scale reported in Woldendorp et al.
(1993), which is generally used by economists (see Alesina et al.,
1998), our data uses updated scales, capturing the increasing
centralisation of parties over time. See Laver and Schofield
(1990), Carmignani (1999).
Time Horizon of Incumbent It measures the potential time horizon of the incumbent
government from the date it takes office. It is calculated each time
a new coalition is formed and equals (maximum time between
elections – time elapsed since the last election)/maximum potential
period of office.
Concentration of the Opposition This is equal to the seats held by the largest opposition party
divided by the total seats held by the opposition. It therefore
measures the degree to which the government faces a united
opposition. See Strom (1984).
Fragmentation of Parties in
Parliament
This is obtained by computing ENP in parliament (not just in the
coalition, as measured above), and transforming its as follows:
fragmentation=1/(1-ENP). See Laasko and Taagepera (1979).
Electoral Volatility This measures the share of votes or seats added or lost by each
party relative to the position after the previous election, divided by
2. A large volatility reflects volatile voter preferences and makes
electoral outcomes more uncertain. See Powell (1982).
Survival Rate of Government This is equal to the proportion of days the government lasted
divided by the maximum period between elections allowed
constitutionally. It measures the degree to which governments
manage to survive for the whole of the legislature.
From the point of view of finding support for our theoretical model, we would
expect two results to emerge from our empirical work. First, in line with the assumption24
of the partisan model, we should find some link between the ideological position of the
government and the fiscal policy actions taken. Second, we would expect to find that
government policy is affected by perceived political instability insofar as it impacts on
the perceived duration of the incumbent government’s tenure. Our panel regressions
results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. In each case we report three different equations.
The first table shows the results obtained when all the available measures of political
instability are included in the regression. The second panel shows the result of a
‘general-to-specific’ search, excluding those political measures found to be less
significant in the first version. The third version checks for the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of a ‘Maastricht effect’, by including both a dummy variable and a time
trend to cover the post-1989 period. This is because most of the countries in our sample
were, by then, engaged in a process of nominal convergence in the run-up to European
Monetary Union, and we want to ensure that our results are not dependent on picking
up a spurious correlation between the political series and the fiscal corrections in the
latter part of our sample. There seems to be no significant nominal convergence effect
on (GC/GTOT), whilst we do capture, as one might expect, an effect on (T/Y) post-
1989: taxes are higher during the convergence phase, with fiscal pressure slowly
subsiding over the period 1989-96. However, these ‘Maastricht variables’ have no
impact on the signs of the coefficients of the political variables or on their statistical
significance.
The results from Table 2 indicate that political instability, as measured by a
larger effective number of parties in the coalition, and fragmentation of the parliament
does tend to encourage a shift towards government consumption and away from
government investment. The total share of the seats held by the coalition has a positive
effect on GC/GTOT, but this probably reflects the fact that larger coalitions are25
generally more fragmented and not necessarily more stable. The other important point
to note from Table 2 is that a significant ideological effect is present, with right-wing
governments generally spending less on government investment than left-wing
governments.  Turning to Table 3, we find that tax revenues as a proportion of GDP
increase with political instability (as measured by the turnover of seats in parliament and
the fragmentation of parliament in terms of political parties). Again, the coalition share
of seats is probably capturing an inverse correlation with the effective number of parties
in the coalition. A larger effective number of parties in the coalition tend to lead to a
higher tax burden. The effect of ideology on taxation is weaker, although the first
regression in Table 3 shows that right wing parties tend to impose lower tax burdens,
although the p-value of this estimated coefficient is 0.119, and it is taken out following
a general-to-specific search.
In terms of our theoretical model, the results for the GC/GTOT regression are
readily interpretable: there is evidence that political instability tends to generate a bias
against government investment and that partisan effects do seem to be important in
explaining GC/GTOT. The behaviour of T/GDP is slightly more problematic, but this is
likely to be due to the rather simple way in which tax finance is handled in our model.
Recall that in our theoretical model no deficit financing is allowed, and because of the
absence of private investment, a monotonic relationship
26 holds between g, t and q .
Empirically the link between a higher spend on public investment and taxation holds.
The link is weaker than our simple analytical model suggests, but that is bound to be the
case given that in practice deficit financing is possible, and that optimal taxation and
                                                       
26 This monotonic relationship between public spending and growth would disappear if one included a
negative effect of taxation on growth at higher tax rates. However, this would lead to a much more
complex political economy model, in that each voter and each political party would have a different
policy mix in a 3-dimensional policy plane (instead of Figure 2). A decision rule would then need to be
assumed for voters to choose between political parties with different policy platforms.26
public investment levels will not follow a monotonic relationship. Furthermore, other
effects of electoral uncertainty on government finance are likely to co-exist to those
identified in our theoretical model. For instance, Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994)
stress the strategic role played by government debt across electoral deadlines. Other
authors (e.g. Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) stress the importance of governments
spending excessively on the public goods they prefer during their period of office.
Indeed, the latter effect is likely to be important: greater political instability seems to
leads to higher, not lower, taxation from our regression results, and this is probably due
to the fact that governments with little chance of survival tend to finance excessive
public consumption spending with high taxation. This is also entirely consistent with
previous empirical studies, as summarised in Alesina and Perotti (1996, 1997).
4.  Conclusions.
This paper has argued that there is a significant link between increased political
instability, reduced public investment and lower productivity growth in the OECD
economies. We explain this observed correlation using a model of endogenous growth
with rational partisan policymakers. Our model shows that, with greater political
uncertainty, it is rational for policy myopia effects to set in and for incumbent politicians
to reduce public spending and taxation, and to increase the share of government
consumption in total government spending.  These effects remain, even if there is a
prospect of exit from office and a subsequent return to power by the incumbent
politicians. A more significant result is that the policy myopia tends to make political
parties adopt growth-discouraging policy platforms with lower taxes and lower
government investment spending than their own constituency would prefer.
Furthermore, policy myopia causes inefficient underinvestment by the government with
a growth rate which is too low compared to the social optimum.27
We also provide some empirical verification for this theoretical model. Using
political data and a panel for 13 European countries over the period 1960-96 we show
that there is a strong correlation between increased political instability and the reduction
in government investment as a proportion of total fiscal spending. We also detect
significant partisan effects on government decisions on public investment and taxation.
Our theoretical model also complements existing political economy models of fiscal
policy. Whilst our empirical results provide strong support for our basic theoretical
model, there is evidence that other complementary factors are important in explaining
the tax revenue to GDP ratio in these economies.
A number of extensions of this framework are possible and we intend to take
these up in future work. One possible extension of our framework is the inclusion of an
explanation for different rates of time preference amongst voters-consumers. The
existence of demographic trends in an overlapping-generations model might explain
why, over time, the distribution of consumer preferences might change, thus affecting
fiscal policy and the long-term growth prospects of the economy. One might then be
able to explain changes in political polarisation and political platforms as functions of
more fundamental forces such as gradual demographic change in the industrialised
economies. We also intend to extend our empirical work (see Darby et al., 2000), to
analyse the impact of political instability on a wider range of fiscal policy measures,
which will provide a fuller picture of the importance of partisan effects and political
instability on fiscal policy.28
Table 2: Dependent Variable = GC/GTOT
Estimation Method: OLS, White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors
Unbalanced Panel: 13 countries, maximum time span 1960-96.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic t-Prob.
Coalition Share of Seats 0.56 0.14 3.90 0.000
ENP in Coalition -12.73 3.46 -3.68 0.000
Ideology 6.27 1.17 5.37 0.000
Coalition Time Horizon 4.74 10.01 0.47 0.636
Concentration of the Opposition -12.93 16.39 -0.79 0.431
Fragmentation 75.89 20.16 3.76 0.000
Electoral Volatility 0.35 0.30 1.15 0.251
Survival Rate 2.15 10.19 0.21 0.833
GDP growth (-1) -0.19 0.08 -2.42 0.016
GDP growth (-2) -0.21 0.08 -2.62 0.009
Included observations: 417 Mean of Dependent Variable 0.850
R squared 0.648 SD of Dependent Variable 0.051
Adjusted R squared 0.628 Akaike Information Criterion -4.033
S.E. of Regression 0.031 Schwartz Information Criterion -3.810
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic t-Prob.
Coalition Share of Seats 0.53 0.15 3.56 0.000
ENP in Coalition -14.37 3.30 -4.35 0.000
Ideology 5.98 1.16 5.16 0.000
Coalition Time Horizon
Concentration of the Opposition
Fragmentation 90.47 18.73 4.83 0.000
Electoral Volatility
Survival Rate
GDP growth (-1) -0.19 0.08 -2.40 0.017
GDP growth (-2) -0.21 0.08 -2.66 0.008
Included observations: 423 Mean of Dependent Variable 0.850
R squared 0.642 SD of Dependent Variable 0.051
Adjusted R squared 0.626 Akaike Information Criterion -4.041
S.E. of Regression 0.031 Schwartz Information Criterion -3.859
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic t-Prob.
Coalition Share of Seats 0.53 0.15 3.56 0.000
ENP in Coalition -14.37 3.30 -4.35 0.000
Ideology 5.98 1.16 5.16 0.000
Coalition Time Horizon
Concentration of the Opposition
Fragmentation 90.47 18.73 4.83 0.000
Electoral Volatility
Survival Rate
GDP growth (-1) -0.19 0.08 -2.40 0.017
GDPgrowth (-2) -0.21 0.08 -2.66 0.008
 Maastricht T -1.12 1.58 -0.71 0.478
 Maastricht C 26.33 7.56 3.48 0.001
Included observations: 423 Mean of Dependent Variable 0.850
R squared 0.667 SD of Dependent Variable 0.051
Adjusted R squared 0.651 Akaike Information Criterion -4.103
S.E. of Regression 0.030 Schwartz Information Criterion -3.90229
Table 3: Dependent Variable = T/GDP
Estimation Method: OLS, White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors
Unbalanced Panel: 13 countries, maximum time span 1960-96.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic t-Prob.
Coalition Share of Seats -0.38 0.18 -2.14 0.033
ENP in Coalition 4.63 3.51 1.32 0.189
Ideology -1.61 1.03 -1.56 0.119
Coalition Time Horizon 0.62 8.11 0.08 0.939
Concentration of the Opposition 9.77 12.67 0.77 0.441
Fragmentation 50.67 15.39 3.29 0.001
Electoral Volatility 0.48 0.23 2.05 0.041
Survival Rate -3.79 7.17 -0.53 0.598
GDP growth (-1) -0.24 0.06 -4.21 0.000
GDP growth (-2) -0.17 0.05 -3.19 0.002
Included observations: 323 Mean of Dependent Variable 0.280
R squared 0.861 SD of Dependent Variable 0.058
Adjusted R squared 0.851 Akaike Information Criterion -4.033
S.E. of Regression 0.031 Schwartz Information Criterion -3.810
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic t-Prob.




Concentration of the Opposition
Fragmentation 57.84 13.10 4.42 0.000
Electoral Volatility 0.51 0.23 2.21 0.030
Survival Rate
GDP growth (-1) -0.24 0.06 -4.25 0.000
GDP growth (-2) -0.16 0.05 -2.86 0.000
Included observations: 331 Mean of Dependent Variable 0.280
R squared 0.855 SD of Dependent Variable 0.057
Adjusted R squared 0.847 Akaike Information Criterion -4.711
S.E. of Regression 0.022 Schwartz Information Criterion -4.505
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic t-Prob.




Concentration of the Opposition
Fragmentation 49.07 13.54 3.63 0.000
Electoral Volatility 0.58 0.25 2.32 0.020
Survival Rate
GDP growth (-1) -0.23 0.06 -4.11 0.000
GDP growth (-2) -0.16 0.05 -3.01 0.000
 Maastricht T -3.36 1.11 -3.03 0.000
 Maastricht C 19.17 5.23 3.66 0.000
Included observations: 331 Mean of Dependent Variable 0.280
R squared 0.860 SD of Dependent Variable 0.057
Adjusted R squared 0.852 Akaike Information Criterion -4.738
S.E. of Regression 0.022 Schwartz Information Criterion -4.50830
Appendix
This appendix will derive the condition for  HL gg < and  HL tt < .
LEMMA A-1 (i) For l‡h, it is always the case that  HL gg < and  HL tt < , and (ii) for
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Proof: Comparing condition (G) for parties L and H, the only difference lies in the
uncertainty-adjusted discount rate,  () ii g r +G . Thus, if  ()() HHLL gg rr +G>+G , the
H MB  curve lies entirely below the  L MB  for  (0,) L g r ˛  in Figure 4, so that  HL gg <.
Moreover,  i g  and  i t  are positively related through (23).













which is always positive for l‡h.
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